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#### OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 July 1962

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From:

Brig. Gen. Lansdale 54

Subject: Contingency Plan

Coffin 11 --

Transmitted herewith is a copy of "United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)," which is submitted for your consideration. The plan has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This plan was developed as a result of reports in mid-June 1962 that the Cuban people were about to revolt against the Castro-Communist regime, without U.S. sponsorship, and the desire expressed by the Special Group that the U.S. be ready for such a contingency. The DOD/JCS representative was tasked by me to develop a plan with the assistance of Operation Mongoose representatives from participating departments and agencies. The DOD/JCS representative did so, and the attached plan is the result.

#### "Eyes Only" copies to:

- 1. General Taylor
- 3. Mr. Gilpatric
- 4. Mr. McCone
- 7. Mr. Harvey, ClA
- 8. Mr. Hurwitch, State
- 9. General Harris, DOD/JCS

- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer
- 10. Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson USIA
- 11. Chief of Operations

## FN SPECIAL HANDLING

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5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director, Central Intelligence

The Director, US Information Agency

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

- 1. The attached plan delineates the course of action to be pursued by the United States in the event that US military intervention is undertaken in support of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba.
- 2. Subject plan is effective for planning on receipt and for the conduct of operations when directed.
- 3. This document requires special handling and is not releasable to foreign nationals.

FOR THE 5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED):

EDWARD G. LANSDALE Brigadier General, USAF Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE





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Previously Declassified/Released on 12-28-88

(F15-421) under provisions of E.O. 12356

by N. Menan, National Security Council



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Partially Declassified/Released on 1-5-89

(F78-758 under provisions of E.O. 12003
by N. Menan, National Security Council

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#### TITLE PAGE

- 1. The title of this document is:
  UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)
- 2. The title of this document is classified SECRET. The plan may be referred to as the Caribbean Survey Group (or, CSG) Plan No. 2, which name is unclassified unless related to Cuba.
- 3. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Section 793 and 795, title 18, U.S.C.). Its transmission or revelation of the contents thereof in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
- 4. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without permission of the Director of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE is prohibited except as necessary for the preparation of supporting plans. Distribution will be restricted to those US government agencies specifically requiring knowledge of the plan on a "Special Handling Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis.

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#### US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

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#### US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2. CUBA. (S)

#### DISTRIBUTION LIST

#### **AGENCY**

COPY NUMBERS

Department of State

Department of Defense

- \*Department of the Treasury
- \*Department of Justice
- \*Department of Health, Education and Welfare
- \*Pepartment of Agriculture

Central Intelligence Agency

US Information Agency

- \*Federal Aviation Agency
- \*Bureau of the Budget

<sup>\*</sup>Distribution to asterisked agencies will not be made until such time as their participation is required in planning or implementation of the plan. When distribution is made to these agencies, only those portions of the plan which pertain to their participation will be disseminated.

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UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

Reference: Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense,

CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation

MONGOOSE, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba,

Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962.

Task Agencies: Department of State

Department of Defense

Central Intelligence Agency

US Information Agency

#### 1. Situation.

- a. The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US Government in the event that a decision is made that the United States undertake military intervention in Cuba.
- b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit the situation include the use of US military force.
- c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditions, and would be considered for implementation under situations less severe. An internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in Cuba where:
  - (1) The revolution is open and threatens the Communist regime;

Department of State

Department of Defense

- \*Department of the Treasury
- \*Department of Justice
- \*Department of Health, Education and Welfare
- \*Department of Agriculture

Central Intelligence Agency

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- (2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and:
- (3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).
- d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent before actual outbreak.

  However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.
- e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of unfriendly forces will be assumed to be as described in current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

#### 2. Mission.

The United States will support and sustain the robellion in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

#### 3. Execution.

- a. Concept of Operations.
- (1) When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community it will be immediately brought to the attention of the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Office of the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE. Evaluation of the situation by the Special Group will determine whether

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### SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan.

(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary,

In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.

(3) US Military Reaction.

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
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
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## SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN.

(4) Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases:

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# THE ROPE SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN



#### c. Department of State Operations.

- (1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States in as broad a multilateral context as possible.
  - (a) Immediately sound out Latin American

# INCLASSIFIED SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

- (b) If 2/3 majority is available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organization of American States (CAS) decision authorizing use of force.
- (c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin
  American nations (preferebly not Nicaragua or Guatemala) to provide token forces to join United States
  forces.
- (d) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and, in response to its appeal for help, come to its assistance with United States military forces and whatever foreign token forces have been made available.
- (e) Keep key members of Congress informed of significant developments.
- (f) Inform all friendly governments of our actions and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-Castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directed violence and offer them assistance.
- (g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend them in these international bodies.
- (h) Engage in all-out psychological warfare and propaganda stressing the morality of United States action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off the bonds of communist englavement.
  - (2) Fhase II (Fost Invasion)
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  - (a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the civil populace.

## STEPET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

- (b) Turn over as rapilly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration of the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests.
  - (c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance.
  - (d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.
  - (e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.

#### d. Central Intelligence Agency Operations.

- (1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.
- (2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.
- (3) When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement, whether it is implemented or not.
- (4) Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.
- (5) CIA will support military operations by clandestine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations.
- (6) After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected versonnel from CIA Headquarters and/



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# SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

#### . United States Information Agency Operations.

- factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.
- (2) In the event of direct 'JS involvement, the Agency will:
  - (a) Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations.
  - (b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.
  - (c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.
- (3) Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:
  - (a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action massive redimensions.

- THE TOTAL TRUES GCONOMIC SERIES
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# STRED SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN



transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.

- (b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid and complete defeat.
- (c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to woid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.
- (d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable.
- (e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.
  - (f) In all psychological planning, special atten-

# SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

#### f. Decartment of the Treasury

Department of Justice

Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Department of Agriculture

Federal Aviation Agency

Bureau of the Budget

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

- a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and
- b. As requested by Chief of Operations,
  Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

#### 4. Coordinating Instructions.

- a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.
- b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
- c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Becretary of State.
- i. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for

#### necessary backup.

- (b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid and complete defeat.
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- (e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.
  - (f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible

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f. Decartment of the Treasury

Department of Justice

Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Department of Agriculture

Federal Aviation Agency

Bureau of the Budget

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- c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
- i. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.

# TOP SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

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